THE RISE OF GOODS-MARKET COMPETITION AND THE FALL OF NOMINAL WAGE CONTRACTING: ENDOGENoUS WAGE CONTRACTING IN A MULTISECTOR ECONOMY l. Introduction
Spurred by the seminal papers by Fischer (1977a) and Gray (1976) , a voluminous literature has explored the implications of nominal wage contracts established by rational workers and firms. Yet relatively few contributions have resolved the fundamental question first debated by Barro (1977) and Fischer ('1977b ): \ffhy would workers and firms in some portion of the economy adopt contracts that fix nominal wages and thereby move these agents away from potentially mutually advantageous opportunities to improve their welfare? Karni (1983) , Duca and VanHoose (1991) , and others have relied on theoretical models in which wages are indexed to output or to profits to motivate ihe potential optimality of nominal wage contracting. Although forms of implicit or explicit indexation, such as profit sharing, undeniably are important features of many contracts, the rational contracting literature continues to lack a clear theoretical explanation for why nominal wage contracting occurs and why its incidence has declined so sharply since the early 1980s. This paper offers one possible, and surprisingly simple, explanation for the observation of nominal wage contracting. Although it differs in its specific approach, this explanation relates to earlier contributions by Gray (1983) and Woglom (1990) , which focused on industry-specific factors that influence the optimal indexation of wage contracts. We find that nominal contracts are likely to be preferable to relying on market-clearing outcomes if sectoral disturbances are sufficiently variable in relation to aggregate shocks. Agreeing to fix the nominal wage over an interval exposes workers to real-wage volatility arising from aggregate price fluctuations that stem from economywide demand and supply disturbances. Nonetheless, such an agreement insulates workers from real-wage variability resulting from sectoral shocks.
This intuitive explanation provides the foundation for a theory for the determination of the equilibrium portion of sectors that choose to adopt nominal wage contracts. In the context of a stylized multisector model, we are able to examine key parameters that influence the extent to which workers and firms choose to contract.
These include not only the variances of aggregate shocks, but also the variance of sectoral shocks and the degree of goods-market competition. Using measures of the extent of contracting and the explanatory variables implied by the theory, we find evidence supporting the theory's implication that sectoral volatility and goods-market competition play key roles in determining the degree of contracting in the U.S. economy and in explaining why contracting has fallen since the mid-1950s. Note that most of the drop in unionization since the early 1980s is due to declines in unionization rates within industries, rather than to shifts in employment across industries (see Table 1 ). The next section of the paper develops our model and uses it to demonstrate the conditions under which nominal wage contracts can be optimal. Section lll extends this model to construct our theory of the determination of the equilibrium portion of the economy that opts to contract. Section lV provides the empirical analysis. Section V offers some concluding thoughts about our model's implications.
ll. The Model and lts Solution
The model parallels the multisector framework developed by Duca and VanHoose (1997, 1998) . lt extends Ball's (1988) framework by incorporating some features from the Duca-VanHoose (1991) multisector model. The latter actually is a two-sector extension of Duca (1987) , whereas the present model truly allows for multiple sectors. 1 Specifically, in the present framework there is a continuum of sectors, indexed l, that are distributed uniformly across a unit interval. Each sector is occupied by large numbers of representative firms and workers. All behavioral relationships are expressed in terms of logarithms, and most constants are suppressed in the exposition to simplify the presentation of the model and its key implications.
The production function for a firm in sectorl is
(1) yi= al,+6, where yi is the log of firm/s output, 4 is the log of employment at firm j, and d is a common, zero-mean productivity shock with finite variance o62. The demand for firm /s output as a share of aggregate output is given by (2) Yi-Y = -4P1-P) + 6', where y = lor y. d.1 is aggregate output and p : lo1 p, dj is the aggregate price level; d, is a firm-specific zero-mean demand shock with a finite variance (discussed in more detail in section lll); and e > 1 is the elasticity of demand for the output of firm7. For the sake of expositional clarity, { is the single sectoral disturbance faced by a firm. lt is straightfonarard to show that including sectoral supply shock greatly complicates expressions for worker losses that we consider below without fundamentally changing comparisons of the relative effects of sectoral versus aggregate shocks.
Aggregate demand for output is characterized by the quantity equation,
where vis a zero-mean aggregate demand disturbance with finite variance variance ou2. All three types of shocks (9, {, and v) are assumed to be i.i.d.
Converting (1), (2), and (3) into levels (denoted by upper-case letters) and combining with the profit function n,= P,Y,-W,L,yields the following labor demand function (with the intercept term suppressed): (4) tt" = -e (wi -p) + (m + v+ 5i-p) + (€ -1)e d +E -aa where w, is the log of the nominal wage at a firm in sectorl. Each firm acts as a perfect competitor in its labor market, in which it faces a pool of sectorally immobile workers whose labor supply schedule is given by
where;t > 0. As in Duca (1987) and Duca and VanHoose (1991) [also see Carlson and Findlay (1992)1, the crucial aspect of this stylized structure is that firms value the real wages they pay in terms of the prices of the products that they produce, while workers value the real wages that they earn in terms of the aggregate price level.2
A fraction, 12, of the sectors have workers and firms that use nominal wage contracts. The remaining share, 1-O, do not. For both groups of sectors, the fullinformation, market-clearing wage equales (4) and (5) and is given by
This is the wage actually paid by a firm in sectorl if its sector is among the share 1-O of sectors that do not use contracts. For such a firm, denoted "nc," substitution of (6) into either (4) or (5) yields the employment level, t1\,* _ ll(m+ v + 6 -p)+ 1e-1)dl \" t1q"*"-*1 +" '
At a contracting firm, however, nominal wage contracts are set to satisfo w, = Ery, = 0. Using this in (4) yields the employment level at a firm in a contracting sector:
Using (8) in (1) implies that output at such a contracting firm is equal to
Substituting (9) into (2) yields an expression for thelh contracting secto/s price in terms of the quantity of money, the aggregate price level, and the shocks:
For a noncontracting firm, substituting (7) into (1) yields the output expression, tii\ ,,* -dL(m+ v+ 6'P)+ 6(l+7)0 \f ''r n -71o* "-o"1 +6
'
Substituting this result into (2) yields the sectoral price,
),(a+e-de)+e
Our key assumption for aggregating output and prices is that the sector-specific shocks "wash out" when summing across firms within each group: Jot 6, d.1 = 0 and li a, a1 = 0 for all O. Under this assumption, the aggregate price level is given by p= dhf l+o+ ft{4pi"la;.. Using (10) and (12), this yields
AIA@ + e -ae) + el + (1-oxa + e -at)11(1-a)+11 Equation (13) permits us to calculate the real wages faced by workers in individual sectors. For a worker in thelh conkacting sector, the real wage is (14) w" -P= -P= {aa -(a +e -at)U.(-a)+1171p * u) * l(1+l)(a +e -ae) + a(e -1)Ol0
while for a worker in thelth noncontracting sector, the real wage is (15)w1*-P= a{>(m + v) + l(a +s -ael + a(e -1)ol0
()IX(a+ e-ae)+ el + (1-O)(a + €-d€)lA(1-a)+11 .L(a+ e-ae)+ 5
An immediate implication of (14) and (15) Finally, we assume that the variance of sector-specific shocks is equal to
(1-lit oa', with od2 > 0. Because sectors are distributed uniformly over the interval [0, 11, the variances of sector-specific disturbances decline from an infinite value for sector zero to a value of zero for sector 1. This implies that workers in sector zero always prefer to adopt nominal wage contracts lor oa2 > 0 and that workers in sector 1 never wish to contract. At a sector located halfirvay along the unit interval, the sectoral variance is exactly equal to op2; whether or not workers in this sector or in sectors to the right or left of it will contract depends on relative real wage variances.
Suppose that sector l" is the sector for which workers are indifferent between nominal wage contracts and Walrasian wages. For the next sector, therefore, it must be the case that real-wage volatility under a nominal wage contract would exceed realwage volatility that would arise without such a contract. Firml', therefore, is the "critical secto/'along lhe unit interval for which a point of indifference is reached concerning adoption of a nominal wage contract.
We assume that workers seek to minimize a weighted average of expected deviations of the real wage and employment from their Walrasian, market-clearing
where /r' is the Walrasian, full-information level of employment (that is, the employment level that each firm would attain under full information if no firms contracted), given by and implicitly differentiate to find that 0Q | 0e < 0 for sufficiently small values of O, so that a relatively small portion of sectors contract. A further requirement for 012 I 0e < 0 is that,l-must be sufiiciently large, so that workers place sufficiently large weight on the real wage component of their loss function. 6 Consequently, for a large range of parameter values the model indicates that the equilibrium share of sectors that use wage contracts will decline as the degree of goods-market competition increases.
The intuition behind this result as follows. A rise in the elasticity of demand caused by an increased degree of goods-market competition reduces the responsiveness of a firm's equilibrium price to a sectoral disturbance. This results in a decline in the sensitivity of the marginal revenue product to sectoral shocks. Therefore, the positions of firms' labor demand schedules and their employment choices respond less completely to sector-specific shifts in the output demand schedules that they face.
The result is a smaller change in the nominal wage. Because sectoral shocks leave the aggregate price level unaffected, the real wage is unambiguously less volatile in the face of sectoral shocks when the demand elasticity increases.
Aggregate demand shocks also induce less employment volatility for both contracting and noncontracting firms when goods markets are more competitive. For most ranges of parameter values, however, the contribution of common demand disturbances to aggregate price volatility rises, thereby adding to variability of the real wage at a contracting firm. As long as real wage variance is a significant factor in workers' loss valuations, therefore, greater aggregate demand variability in the presence of increased goods-market competition tends to reduce the extent of nominal wage contracting.
ll Aggregate productivity shocks contribute directly to labor demand variability, which causes greater employment variability at both type of firms. The real wage effects of aggregate supply disturbances differ, however. At noncontracting firms, a negative productivity shock reduces the equilibrium nominal wage while raising the aggregate price level; at contracting firms such shocks affect the real wage only through the price-level response. Under increased goods-market competition, an aggregate supply shock induces a smaller price response at firms, as discussed above, and so the sensitivity to of the value of labor's marginal product to such a shock declines. Consequently, the effect that a productivity disturbance has on labor demand is reduced with a higher elasticity of demand, making the nominal wage at noncontracting firms less responsive to aggregate supply disturbances. The result is that greater goods-market competition reduces the real wage volatility that is induced by supply shocks at noncontracting firms relative to contracting firms. Cefens panbus, this leads to a reduction in the equilibrium share of firms that use wage contracts.
lV. Empirical Analysis
Using two-step cointegration methods, we test our model's implications that contract use declines if the degrees of goods-market competition, aggregate demand shock variance, or aggregate supply variance rise, or, for low contracting economies like the United States, if the variance of sector-speclfic shocks falls. We first test for cointegration among contract share, inflation risk, the degree of goods-market competition, aggregate supply variance, and the variance sectoral nominal output growth. Then we perform second-stage regressions ofthe change in the log of contract snare.
A. Da|e and Variables
The variables used fall into five @tegories: contract share, aggregate demand variance, supply shock variance, goods-market competition, and sectoral variance. Contract Share Given the absence of comprehensive measures of the share of U.S.
workers under contracts, we use data on unionization rates in the private sector.
Although many workers have annual pay adjustments, we are more interested in contracts longerthan a year, because such contracts expose agents to a greater risk of expectational errors, which play a key role in determining contract share in our model.
Union contracts generally exceed a year in length, and for this reason unionization rates appear to be a good proxy for contract share (see Figure 1 ). Table 1 . However, only in the fully specified model that includes the sectoral variance and competition variables are the signs of the estimated cointegration consistent with contract theory. In particular, in the other models the cointegrating vectors imply a positive relationship between inflation and unionization. One plausible explanation for t6 this stems from the fact that inflation and the measure of competition tend to be negatively related overthe long run. Hence, omitting e inadvertently mixes the positive effect of low competition on unionization with the negative impact of high inflation on the incentive to contract.
C. Second-Sfage Error-Correction Resulb
As noted earlier, because the log level of union share is l(2), the second-stage error-correction models use A^log(union share) as the dependent variable with errorcorrection terms based on cointegrating relationships from Table 2 . Table 3 presents six models, the first three of which have no short-run terms but differ according to which cointegrating vector from Table 2 was used to define the error-correction term. The other three models corresoond to models 1. 2. and 3 in terms of which error-correction term is used but include two short-run variables -namely, the t lag of the change in aggregate supply shock variance (AOILVAR) and a dummy for recessions (RECESS) which equals 1 in years containing any NBER-recession quarters. Of the first differences of the various long-run variables, only the contemporaneous first difference of OILVAR proved to be a statistically significant short-run variable. The recession dummy was tested because during recessions, Alog(union share) tends to be higher, plausibly reflecting that union share tends to be bolstered in recessions, during which larger and more unionized establishments are more likely to survive and during which larger firms tend to cut back on subcontracting work to smaller, less unionized firms.
(More established firms tend to be more unionized, given that it takes time to organize a new firm.) Table 3 Goes Here Four patterns arise across the models. First, the competition models substantially outperform the corresponding conventional and noncompetition models, as evidenced by significant improvement in FP. Second, the corresponding t7 noncompetition models outperform the conventional models, indicating that accounting for sectoral shocks through the error-correction terms assists in explaining the changing pace of deunionization. Third, the eror-correction terms are more significant and have larger magniludes in the competition models, implying that shifts in competition have had large effects on the speed of U.S. deunionization. Fourth, recessions have significantly, albeit only temporarily, slowed the pace of deunionization. To implement (81), we include nominal nonfinancial corporate GDP to prory for sales, two measures of fixed costs, and several terms to control for short-run movements. In principle, fixed costs can be measured by the ratios of consumption of fixed capital and net interest to nonfinancial corporate GDP (DEP and NET, respectively).r1 However, because of shifts in the use of debt and equity and the difficulty of disentangling equity inveslment from stock price shifts, NET reflects swings in leverage, as well as in interest rates, spreads between corporate and Treasury rates, and in inventory financing. Because NET thereby will give a distorted picture of fixed costs, we also sublract off its estimated impact in measuring the long-run markup e
To cyclically adjust profits (after IVA and CCAdj adjustments), we include the t through t-3 lags of real GDP growth (Ay), year-over{ear GDP groMh lagged four First, the broader pre-1 959 category of "real estate" was used. Detailed data on the division between "nonfarm housino services" and "other real estate" were not available for the pre-1959 period. Second, separate data for "social services" and 'membership organizations
were not available prior to 1959. Hence, we treated these post-1958 categories as a single category.
Third, the pre-1987 category of "miscellaneous professional services" was replaced by an "other services" category, and some "business services" output was reclassified into this new "other services category." To minimize data distortions, the pre-1987 categories of "business services" and "miscellaneous professional services"
were combined to create a "business and other services" category that is defined using post-1987 data as the sum of "business services" and "other services." Fifth, there were several shifts in classification that involved the renaming of two categories in 1987 and the redefinition of a category that retained its name. To prevent these classification shifts from creating a spike in SSHIFT, we combined the involved categories into a "general machinery" category, defined as the sum of nominal output in the "machinery except electrical," "electric and electronic equipment," and "instruments and related products" categories before 1987 and afterward as the sum of nominal output in the "industrial machinery and equipment," "electronic and other electrica equipment," and "instrument and related products."
Sixth, we excluded the category "holding and other investment offices." Nominal output estimates for this very small sector were negative in recent years, making these estimates highly dubious.
Finally, overlapping data for 1987 using the pre-1987 and post-1987 classification schemes revealed some slight differences in the categories of "furniture and fixtures," "stone, clay, and glass products," "paper and allied products," "rubber and miscellaneous plastics products,' "telephone and telegraph," "radio and television,"
"legal services," and "amusement and recreation services." To prevent the relatively small differences in output levels arising from more minor reclassification shifts from creating an artificial spike in SSHIFT, the value of SSHIFT for 1987 was based on ' lf sectoral productivity shocks are incorporated into the model, which we have not exposited because of the exceeding complicated expressions that result, the critical value of 1-changes, but this qualitative conclusion is unaffected.
u The critical value of f relevant for this comparison need not be as large as the critical value determining the effect of greater sectoral volatility on equilibrium contract share, however.
? We use inflation rather than velocity shocks to measure aggregate demand variance mainly because long-run instability in money velocity and redefinitions of monetary aggregates (both Ml and M2) make it difficult to construct realtime measures that were widely observed by workers and firms.
' For example, if increased variances in sectoral output shares are correlated with surges in the pace of business formation, unionization rates could fall because it takes time to organize the greater number of workers employed at new firms into unions.
' For example, the profit-output ratio would fall if firms levered up and then would rebound if firms delever, because firms would make greater payments to debt capital holders than to equity capital holders. Not adjusting for this swing, the cyclically 30 adjusted profit-output ratio would be U-shaped, as it was during the late-1980s rise in leverage and the early-1990s fall in leverage. '4 Denoting the coefficients on U, and U,-, as p., and Br, the unemployment effects can be expressed as (P1+82)Ut -(FrU, -prUul) = (B,+pr)U,-prAU1. 1. Decline due to enployment shifts equals euployrnent-share adjusted 1983 unionization rate (ll-.45) minus the 1996 unionization rate (L1,.2). The employnent-share adiusted l-983 unionization race equals the sum of 1983 erniloy'rnenc shares b! industry muLtiplied by their iorresponding 1996 sectoral unionization shares. 
